Introduction
The war began on the Egyptian front with the advance of the Italian Marshall Rodolfo Graziani across the Egyptian-Libyan border on September 1940. The crossing released a series of attacks and counter-attacks and the removal of one general and the appointment of another. General Sir Archibald Wavell succeeded in pushing Graziani back and occupying the city of Benghazi on February 1941. Graziani was then removed and General Erwin Rommel appointed as the Head of the Axis Forces in North Africa, succeeding in standing up to Wavell and forcing him out of Libya. Wavell in turn was removed and a series of British Generals were subsequently appointed and removed in countering Rommel of whom the last was General Auchinleck who managed to score some victories and eventually was forced to retreat back to the Egyptian territories. He finally managed to achieve a Pyrrhic victory after a battle that lasted six days halting The history of the war on the Egyptian Front just summarized above can be described as the standard narrative of attack and retreat which hundreds of volumes reproduce as they focus on the brilliance of Rommel and the genius of Montgomery. In all these narratives Egypt is presented as a theatre of war rather than a participatory player. The two questions this paper sets out to answer are thus the following: Would it have been possible for the Allied Forces to withstand the attacks of Graziani and Rommel without help from Egypt? After dozens of battles on the North African front, would an Allied victory have been possible had Egypt taken the side of the Axis Forces and declared war against Britain and its Allies? In Western narratives of war which focus on the fact that Egypt did not have much to offer militarily and economically to the Allies, the answer to these usually comes out as a straightforward yes. On the basis of new sources which reveal the extent of Egypt's overlooked contribution to WWII, this paper contends otherwise.
Britain realized early on the important role Egypt could play-with its army, its resources and its strategic position-in the case war broke out. This explains the reason behind the 1936 Treaty where Britain required Egypt to offer all possible assistance in case of war. As the international situation became more complex in Europe throughout the month of August 1939, the British Ambassador to Egypt Miles W. Lampson warned the Egyptian Prime Minister Maher Pasha that the situation in Europe is moving toward war and that Egypt should prepare to declare martial law and take the necessary precautions to inspect the ships arriving to the Egyptian ports according to the provisions of the 1936 Treaty.
2 The Egyptian government did indeed comply and on August 28, 1939 set up a special commis-
